Classic Aircraft profiled every issue -

Issue 11 - Harrier: Aviation and politics: Do not mix - Editor's introduction

I started writing about the Harrier years ago. I was captured by the unusual capabilities of the aircraft, the very oddness that is the essence of a Harrier in flight. So many great engineers and aviation pioneers tried and failed to create a working V/STOL fixed wing aircraft, then in the middle of this struggle, a Frenchman is introduced to two Englishmen by an American... and against all odds they succeed, not just succeed, but succeed brilliantly. It sounds like a set-up for a joke, but the “punchline” was the world’s first operational single engined fixed wing vertical/short takeoff and landing aircraft, the Harrier.

The important part of that description is single engined. When Michel Wibault (the Frenchman) introduced his concept to Sir Stanley Hooker and Gordon Lewis (the Englishmen) through Colonel John Driscoll (the American), what was to emerge is still the only engine capable of providing vertical and horizontal thrust in a single unit, the Bristol/Rolls-Royce Pegasus.

What this aircraft and engine achieved together is simply incredible. Overseas sales have brought millions of pounds into the country. Wars have been won – one on its slender wings alone. Innocent civilians have been protected from harm by despotic regimes. It has been developed by the US and Britain into an entirely new machine in effect, forging strong engineering links and military friendships between the countries. It is still one of the most potent and successful front line aircraft in service in the world, subject to upgrades and enhancements that keep it at the cutting edge 51 years after the prototype first flew in 1960, yet here, in 2011, the Harrier thunders on.

Well, almost.

This is where the anger comes in. India, Italy, Spain, Thailand and the United States Marine Corps still have Harriers. The United Kingdom, home of the Harrier, does not.

In writing the Harrier story, I discovered that the whole program hung on the knife edge of a political decision so often it was ridiculous, especially given the capabilities of the aircraft and its obvious applications. Some may consider that naïve, that all expensive projects have a political dimension that is inescapable in the modern world. The money has to come from somewhere, as I am often told. However, when those decisions are so obviously wrong, is it not our duty to question them?

The last RAF or Royal Navy Harrier flew in December 2010, yet the aircraft had only recently been subject to a £500 million upgrade that was to keep it in service until 2018, to retire when the F-35 entered service. A £574 million maintenance contract had been signed in 2009, and the £84 million Tactical Information Exchange Capability upgrade had flown for the first time on June 29, 2010 with service clearance trials ongoing, when suddenly the whole fleet was scrapped.

The reason was to reduce costs as part of the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR)and due to its “limited capabilities”. Interestingly, the limited capabilities referred to include the removal of the 25mm Aden gun pods from these aircraft. Again, a political cost saving decision, but one which prompted a Parachute Regiment Major in Afghanistan to refer to the gun-less air support his position was receiving as “utterly, utterly useless”. So, in effect, one political decision so crippled the aircraft it made it easy prey for another.

Other decisions of the SDSR make less sense. The two new aircraft carriers for the Royal Navy will have no aircraft for several years after launching, and one will be mothballed immediately. The F-35B STOVL will not be purchased, the F-35C variant with no vertical take off capability will replace it in smaller numbers. The end of the Harrier is also the end of V/STOL in the UK forces, despite its vindications of the past. For the next 10 years, the UK will have no aircraft carrier capability and no close support aircraft. It seems the lessons of the Falklands have been completely forgotten.
 
The missions over Libya as part of Operation Ellamy could have been tailor made for the Harrier Force which would have been a lot less expensive than the types used, in terms of finance, manpower and the damage these operations have done to the Typhoon program.

That operations in Libya began three months after the ideal aircraft to conduct them was retired can be seen as coincidence. That the US Marine Corps reactivated two Harrier Squadrons three weeks after the decision to retire the UK’s force can only be seen as proof that the decision was operationally wrong. I would dearly love to know how retiring an aircraft in the middle of expensive and already paid for upgrades is a cost saving. I would also love to know why other forces’ Harriers still, and always have, carried guns.

This may be seen as bolting the door after the horse has trotted into the sunset, but I believe that such a ground breaking, effective and incredibly reliable aircraft as the Harrier deserves some comment, even if it is just to record the lamentable nature of its demise.

Dammit. It didn’t work. I am still angry. I will try to cheer up by next issue, promise.

All best,
Tim